Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Alistair Darling) has made the following Ministerial Statement.
	I am making a Statement today to the House on the interaction of existing government policy and planning procedures with regard to the need for additional gas supply infrastructure.
	This Statement reiterates previous public commitments 1 made by this Government on the importance of gas supply infrastructure and will help clarify the government policy context for planning and consent decisions on gas supply infrastructure projects.
	The UK economy faces a major challenge: our indigenous gas supplies are in decline and we are moving towards increasing import dependence on gas. To manage this change, new gas supply infrastructure is needed to increase Great Britain's capacity to import, store and transport gas efficiently. A regulatory environment that enables the development of timely and appropriately sited infrastructure projects is therefore vital.
	The need for increased gas supply infrastructure and a regulatory environment to allow such infrastructure to be delivered to the market in a timely fashion was set out by the Government in the Energy White Paper of 2003 2 : Our Energy Future—creating a low carbon economy. It identified four challenges, one of which was securing the reliability of energy supplies. This remains integral to an energy policy that meets the needs and expectations of all energy consumers. It is being considered as part of the DTI's energy review 3 in the context of the measures that are required to develop the GB market framework for delivering reliable energy supplies. It is clear that any weakness in infrastructure could push up gas prices, or result in interruptions to supply, with harmful consequences for both UK markets and UK consumers.
	The decline in our indigenous supplies has serious implications for our gas import infrastructure, storage and domestic transportation needs. The Government welcome all solutions which could help address this need and favour no particular route. The market is responding to this challenge, with actual and planned investment in gas import infrastructure, storage and related transportation of some £10 billion over 2005–10. The projects have the potential to make a real difference to our gas supply infrastructure; by 2010, our storage capacity could more than double and our import infrastructure is planned to more than triple.
	Ultimately, as my honourable friend the Minister for Energy noted to the House last year, failure to help facilitate such infrastructure will, immediately or over time, create difficulties in balancing supply and demand, reducing the reliability of our energy supply arrangements, with potentially disastrous consequences for the local, regional and national communities and economies.
	To meet this challenge we require a regulatory environment that enables the development of timely and appropriately sited new gas supply infrastructure projects. The current consents regime is only now starting to deal with a new tranche of gas supply infrastructure projects; we must consider how avoidable delays can be prevented in the future to ensure that these projects, and those that follow them, can commission on time if approved. This means a planning consent regime that offers more clarity for developers about processes and timescales, thereby contributing to a lower overall level of risk for developers.
	Our focus must therefore be on reducing the regulatory barriers to maximising gas supply, a view shared by the Trade and Industry Committee, and in line with this Government's focus on better regulation. We are looking to achieve this through a number of measures, as set out by my right honourable friend the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in a parliamentary debate on security of supply earlier this year. The measures will cover:
	legislation (when parliamentary time permits) to establish an offshore regime to enable innovative projects to go forward—gas storage in salt caverns offshore, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) import projects with offshore unloading;
	a review of the onshore consents regimes, aiming towards simplification and streamlining of procedures, in co-ordination with the energy review, and with the Barker review of land use planning into the planning and land use system; and
	measures to improve public understanding of the need for additional gas supply infrastructure projects, including onshore projects, and to promote best practice among project sponsors when applying for regulatory consents.
	This Statement forms an integral part of the third action, and my department is actively progressing the other measures.
	This Government believe that allowing the free operation of a competitive GB market, within an appropriate regulatory framework overseen by an independent regulator, is the most efficient way to ensure security of gas supply. Government policy establishes broad objectives, which are supported by light touch regulation. The private sector then takes commercial decisions to develop the infrastructure that can maintain and improve the reliability of energy supplies. This Government warmly welcome the potential diversity of solutions that the market is seeking to deliver. Both onshore and offshore, large and small solutions are required to meet our needs.
	The storage of gas onshore and offshore is possible only in certain geological structures, which are present in a limited number of locations in Great Britain. Such salt formations must have a certain minimum thickness in order to store gas.
	Gas is now also stored in some depleted oil and gas fields. Only one field is currently in operation but there are several others at different stages of development. These provide "ready made" storage structures with seals that have proven to be secure for millions of years. The nature of these structures is well known from the data collected during their development. An additional benefit is that storage in oil-bearing reservoirs can increase the amount of oil ultimately extracted from them. However, the reservoir characteristics needed for storage can be different from those needed to develop the field and not all onshore fields will be suitable for gas storage. Local planning officers should take this into consideration when making or preparing advice on planning consents.
	The DTI recognises the importance of local democracy in the decision-making process, and the significant contribution that local involvement makes to the quality of decision-making. The views of all stakeholders must be taken into account. But if we are to maintain a rigorous planning system, it must also enable decisions to be taken in reasonable time. A balance must be struck between meeting the concerns of local authorities and those they represent, and the national need for infrastructure that will provide us with secure energy supplies9.
	As my honourable friend the Minister for Energy set out to the House last year10, the provision of energy infrastructure is part of a delivery system that provides an essential national service. Business and homes in the UK require a reliable supply of energy free from disruption and interruption. New energy infrastructure projects may not always appear to convey any particular local benefit but they provide crucial national benefits, which all localities share. In particular, projects add to the reliability of national energy supply, from which every user of the system benefits.
	Against the background of the clear national need for new gas storage infrastructure, it is important that developers, where they are not already doing so, start an early dialogue with planning authorities to ensure that appropriate policies are included in regional spatial strategies and local development frameworks. Where developments need to come forward ahead of changes to local planning policy, it will be vital for developers to begin an early dialogue with local planning authorities, and the community more generally, about their proposals. It will be important to ensure that the environmental impacts of their proposals are better understood, and that the national need for these developments is fully taken into account by local planning authorities when making their decisions regarding planning consents.
	In summary, we need timely and appropriately sited gas supply infrastructure to be delivered by the market, because:
	Great Britain is becoming increasingly dependent on gas imports, and requires new gas supply infrastructure to help ensure security of supply;
	new projects enable extra supply and storage options if they proceed without avoidable delays;
	there are limited locations currently suitable for much-needed gas storage projects;
	onshore storage is needed to enable slow-moving gas to be available close to market when consumers require it; and
	new energy infrastructure projects provide national benefits, shared by all localities.
	I am today placing in the Libraries of the House a fuller note, including annexes, setting out government policy, to help clarify the context for planning and consent decisions on gas supply infrastructure.
	1 Annex A
	2 Energy White Paper, February 2005, Cm 5761, Section 6.51
	3 Energy Review consultation document, Our Energy Challenge, DTI, January 2006
	 Written Ministerial Statement, "Renewable Energy Statement of Need for Transmission System Upgrades", 21 July 2005
	 Trade and Industry Committee First Report on Security of Supply, 13 December 2005
	 House of Commons, 12 January 2006, Official Report, cols. 486-534
	 Consultation currently being carried out as part of the Defra Marine Bill: paragraphs 9.76-9.79: www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/marine/uk/policy/marine-bill/index.htm
	 In some countries, aquifers are also used to store gas. Again, specific geological conditions are required for such storage. There is some current commercial interest in such projects in the UK
	 DCLG Planning Policy Statement 1 recommends planning authorities should "recognise the wider sub-regional, regional or national benefits of economic development and consider these alongside any adverse local impacts."
	10 Written Ministerial Statement, "Renewable Energy Statement of Need for Transmission System Upgrades", 21 July 2005

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Alistair Darling) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	Introduction
	It has been a tight winter for energy supply, and this has led to high energy prices. The energy market had taken steps to prepare for the winter, and Government worked closely with Ofgem and National Grid to ensure that all possible actions were taken to secure energy supplies. Looking ahead to next winter, I am announcing today the creation of a Business Energy Forum to look at strategic energy issues. Looking beyond next winter, I am depositing in the House a parliamentary statement of need for additional gas supply infrastructure. This sets out the economic case for taking action on planning to enable our strong energy market to deliver.
	Outturn for Winter 2005–06
	The gas market for winter 2005–06 was tighter than the previous winter. Gas supplies were maintained, but increased gas prices arising from the tight supply-demand balance were a major issue for industry as well as for domestic users. A fire at the Rough gas storage facility on 16 February 2006 led to the facility being taken out of operation, and heightened concerns about supply during the final stages of the winter. There was one gas balancing alert, on 13 March 2006, which followed the loss of the Rough storage facility, but no forcible interruptions due to supply-demand constraints. Adequate supplies of gas and electricity were successfully maintained on every day this winter.
	The market had responded to projected increased demand, with additional import infrastructure at the Isle of Grain LNG terminal, the expansion of the Interconnector import capacity, and a new storage facility, Humbly Grove. All these began operation at the start of the winter. DTI played a proactive role, working with developers and regulators to smooth the path for these developments. The Government encouraged offshore producers to be ready to maximise their production capacity in the winter, and supplies of gas direct from the offshore fields held up well throughout the winter.
	There was significant demand-side response from the electricity-generating sector. In terms of baseload generation, there was switching from gas to coal. In addition, there was some switching from gas to distillate fuel. The level of coal-fired generation was more significant than had been expected, and this clearly has implications for carbon emissions and climate change. Accordingly, the experience gained here will be taken into account by the Government's energy review.
	Other energy-intensive users also reduced demand significantly in response to high prices. The Government also worked to increase the awareness of energy intensive users of the importance of demand-side response, and had facilitated switching from gas to other fuels for power generators and other users, by working with the Environment Agency to ensure that this could be accommodated within the regulatory regime.
	Price signals would have been expected to be sufficient to incentivise full use of new import facilities. There was, however, under-utilisation of this capacity, despite strong price signals to the market, particularly early in the winter. Lower than anticipated delivery of gas from continental European sources through the Interconnector led to further increases in price. Ofgem has estimated that this cost UK consumers up to £1.5 billion this year over the winter. The Government are looking into how to resolve this, supporting Ofgem and the European Commission's investigations. The Government also continue to push hard for liberalisation of the European market, including, in particular, transparency of gas stocks and movements throughout the EU.
	Throughout the winter, the Government worked closely with National Grid and Ofgem to communicate information on the gas market to Parliament, industry and the public, in particular on price. The Government recognise the difficulties faced by industrial users, particularly energy intensive energy users, and also domestic users.
	For domestic users, the Government have increased funding for tackling fuel poverty by approximately £300 million over the 2005–08 period. The Government's main way of tackling fuel poverty in vulnerable households in England is Warmfront. Similar schemes—Warm Deal, the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme, and the Warm Homes Scheme—also operate Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. These provide heating and insulation measures to vulnerable households. To help those on low-incomes, the Government have committed themselves to continued winter fuel payments for the duration of this Parliament.
	Outlook for Winter 2006–07
	National Grid's draft winter consultation document, published today, indicates the supply-demand balance for gas next winter is expected again to be tight. Only a modest increase in demand is anticipated. Production of gas from the UK continental shelf, although lower than last winter, will continue to be by far the most important source of supply to the UK. Over the medium term, it will continue to contribute significantly to meeting UK demand. The balance of demand will need to be met through imports and release of gas from storage.
	The market is delivering further new import infrastructure that is due to come on line next winter. This includes the completion of the Langeled Pipeline from Norway and the further expansion of the Belgian interconnector. There are also plans for the Balgzand-Bacton pipeline from the Netherlands to be in place this winter, and the new Excelerate LNG ship import facility in Teesside has recently been announced. In addition, the Humbly Grove storage facility should have had the opportunity to fill up with gas over this summer, unlike last year. The Government are monitoring carefully progress on restoring operations at the Rough storage facility.
	The availability of adequate import infrastructure is only one aspect of supply. The Government remain committed to the liberalised market as the means of delivering security of supply. Interactions between the UK and other markets are growing, and the Government will be working to ensure that imports through the Interconnector and imports of LNG respond to demand from the UK. We will be meeting key companies over coming months, as we did last winter, to emphasise the importance to the UK of maximising gas supply in the winter. We will continue our efforts with Ofgem and the European Commission to push for greater transparency and liberalisation in Continental European markets.
	Electricity generation is expected to be similar to last winter, with around one-third of electricity generation capacity gas-fired. Last winter showed, however, that during periods of high gas demand, coal generation becomes significant as the base load generator, and some gas-fired generators switch from gas to distillate as an alternative fuel. The Government will be working to ensure that reliability of alternative power generation capacity is enhanced, and to ensure that the environmental regulatory regime allows flexibility for power generators to switch from gas to alternative fuels if necessary.
	The Government are taking early action to ensure that security of supply is assured during the coming winter, and to ensure that the impacts of a tight demand-supply balance are mitigated. The Government recognise that all participants in the market have a role to play, including the gas supply industry, including producers, transporters and suppliers, users including industry, power generators and other energy intensive users, and regulatory bodies.
	The Government are working to ensure that the best possible information on supply and demand forecasting is available to the industry. An important part of this includes working closely with National Grid, which is producing its winter consultation document, to be published by Ofgem today. The Government are also reviewing energy emergency arrangements, as part of proper contingency and emergency planning, consulting industry and other interested parties. The Government will be working closely with CBI, Ofgem, National Grid, producers, shippers, suppliers and industrial users to ensure that all possible preparations are made for next winter, that these are effectively co-ordinated, and communicated.
	I am therefore announcing today the creation of a business energy forum. This will be a high-level group jointly chaired by my honourable friend, Malcolm Wicks, and Richard Lambert, director-general designate of the CBI. The group will provide a forum for discussion of a broad range of strategic energy issues, with a focus on security of supply next winter. Its members will include representatives from industry bodies, including the Engineering Employers Federation, the Energy Intensive Users Group, and the Chemical Industries Association, gas producers and shippers, electricity generators and suppliers and representatives of other user groups.
	Looking beyond next winter, there is further significant investment in gas supply infrastructure planned. The need for additional infrastructure, and a regulatory environment to allow such infrastructure to be delivered to the market in a timely fashion remains a priority for this Government. That is why today I am also depositing in the House a parliamentary statement of need for additional gas supply infrastructure, which sets out the economic case for our growing need for more infrastructure, and clarifies the governmental policy context for planning and consent decisions on gas supply infrastructure projects.
	The lessons of last winter are being taken into account. In the light of last winter's experience, gas supplies should be able to meet daily demand, although concerns remain about high prices. The Government remain committed to ensuring that the UK's strong energy market has the opportunity to operate effectively next winter and in the years to come.

Lord Drayson: My honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Tom Watson) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	I would like to place on record my appreciation for the important work being done by Professor Simon Wessely and his colleagues at King's College, London, on the health of personnel who have served on Operation TELIC. Today, two papers by his team have been published in the Lancet summarising the initial findings of a study which the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Lewis Moonie, announced on 7 May 2003 (Official Report, House of Commons, col. 34WS).
	The first paper, The Health of UK Military Personnel who deployed to the 2003 Iraq War, concludes that the vast majority of personnel who deployed have not so far experienced a statistically significant worse health outcome compared to those who did not deploy. However, the study has found that a small but measurable number of reservists (when compared either with regulars who did deploy or reservists who did not deploy) are showing some increased health effects as a result of deployment—particularly for common mental disorders (such as anxiety, depression and stress), post-traumatic stress disorder and fatigue. It remains the case, though, that the reported rates of indicators of common mental ill-health for both reservists and regulars are broadly of the same order as found in the general UK population.
	Professor Wessely's second paper, Is there an Iraq War syndrome?, analyses the patterns of illness reported by UK service personnel following deployment on Operation TELIC and compares them with those seen after the 1990–91 Gulf conflict. He concludes that there is no sign of a repeated pattern of the illnesses, often referred to as Gulf War syndrome, reported widely after the latter.
	The MoD takes the health of service personnel, both regulars and reservists, very seriously indeed and clearly this study is an important piece of work which will help us perform our duty of care to our personnel and their families. Although funded by MoD the study is independent. I welcome the conclusions published today and I am sure that they will be welcomed by the men and women who have been serving in Iraq. Clearly, it is very reassuring to know that the overwhelming majority of service personnel are returning to the UK physically and mentally well after service on Operation TELIC. The MoD's implementation of health lessons learned during Operation Granby has undoubtedly contributed to this. It is obviously especially important that we act on the key finding from the study in respect of the mental health of reservists. This is an area that we have already been monitoring closely and looking at possible solutions. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today a package of support for these particular service people.
	We already offer a comprehensive physical and mental healthcare service to mobilised reservists. I will introduce later this year an enhanced post-operational mental healthcare programme for recently demobilised reservists. The programme will offer a mental health assessment, conducted by appropriately qualified members of the Defence Medical Services (DMS). This will be available to any member of the reserve forces who has been demobilised since January 2003 following deployment on any operation overseas and who has a concern about their mental health as a result. If individuals are then assessed as having a mental health problem that is categorised primarily as post-traumatic stress disorder or a related traumatic adjustment disorder, and that is directly related to their operational deployment and of a nature that can be treated within the resources of the DMS, they will be offered out-patient treatment by the DMS.
	If the assessment identifies cases that fall outside the parameters set out above, such as complex multi-disorder diagnoses or acute cases requiring in-patient care, the DMS will refer them—with our assessment results—on to the appropriate NHS providers in order to assist their access to NHS treatment, as well as encouraging contact with the relevant welfare organisations to ensure follow-up.
	I will make a further announcement in a few months to confirm the details of the service that will be provided, including the location(s) at which the assessments will be provided, and the date on which the service will commence.
	This scheme will complement work we have in hand to improve the understanding of military mental health issues in general across the NHS, and ensure that the necessary services are available for veterans of whatever age suffering from mental illness. This work involves health departments, the NHS providers and the charitable sector, and I hope to announce details on the outcome of this work later this year when it is completed.
	Given the current findings of Professor Wessely's work, and his view that it would be premature to conclude that there has been no health effect as a. result of deployment to Iraq, my department is considering carefully the recommendation that further follow-up research is required. I understand that Professor Wessely plans to publish further results in due course.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport (Douglas Alexander) has made the following Ministerial Statement.
	We announced in November last year that the Department for Transport will be undertaking a small number of trials at stations on London's surface and underground rail networks, to test the effectiveness of passenger screening equipment in an operational environment.
	The first trial took place on the platforms for the Heathrow Express at Paddington station over a four-week period during January and February of this year. The data from the trial have been analysed and will be included in the final trial report.
	The next phase of the project will be held at stations on the London Underground and will test equipment that can detect traces of explosives on passengers and their belongings.
	Following consultation with London Underground, the British Transport Police and other stakeholders, Canary Wharf and Greenford have been chosen to host the next series of trials.
	The trial at Canary Wharf will begin on Wednesday 17 May and will also run for a period of around four weeks. The trial will test the use of a document scanner, a finger scanner and a cabin baggage X-ray machine. Each day a small number of randomly selected passengers will be invited to take part, although any participation will be entirely voluntary. There will be minimal disturbance to the station's operations and the flow of passengers throughout the day will not be affected.
	Once the trial at Canary Wharf trial has been completed, a similar trial at Greenford station will begin in which equipment that can analyse explosive traces on clothing and bags using swabbing and air samples will be tested.
	Furthermore, in conjunction with the British Transport Police, we shall be trialling the use of explosives-sniffing dogs at a main London station and a major regional station, also for a limited period.
	The sole purpose of these trials that we are undertaking is purely to test their application in a genuine rail environment. They are not direct measures to enhance security at these stations. No decisions have been taken on the future use of this equipment, all the data and feedback we can gain during the tests are merely to help inform any future judgments.
	The UK's railway system is a network made up of 2,500 stations and 11,000 miles of track. It carries 1 billion passengers a year. The British public understand that a closed security system on a rail network of this size is unworkable.
	However we must still aim to cut down the risks as much as possible, while still allowing people to go about their day-to-day business.
	No single security measure is either foolproof or capable of mitigating every threat so we need to keep a range of measures available. It is therefore important that we not only consider both existing and emerging technologies but that we subject them to vigorous tests in a mix of authentic environments to see just how effectively they can contribute towards keeping our networks as safe and efficient as possible.